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Through dreaming, a different facet of the self is created as a result of a self-organizing
process in the brain. Self-organization in biological systems often happens as an answer
to an environmental change for which the existing system cannot cope; self-organization
creates a system that can cope in the newly changed environment. In dreaming,
self-organization serves the function of organizing disparate memories into a dream since
the dreamer herself is not able to control how individual memories become weaved into
a dream. The self-organized dream provides, thereby, a wide repertoire of experiences;
this expanded repertoire of experience results in an expansion of the self beyond that
obtainable when awake. Since expression of the self is associated with activity in specific
areas of the brain, the article also discusses the brain basis of the self by reviewing studies
of brain injured patients, discussing brain imaging studies in normal brain functioning when
focused, when daydreaming and when asleep and dreaming.
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INTRODUCTION
How do consciousness and a sense of self arise from pro-
cesses occurring in the brain? Many authors have asked and
suggested answers to this question including: Crick and Koch
(1990), Rees and Frith (2007) on the neural correlates of con-
sciousness; Hobson (2009), Långsjö et al. (2012) Dehaene and
Changeux (2011), Revonsuo (2006) on a general theory of con-
sciousness; Kahn and Gover (2010), Desseilles et al. (2011),
Dang-Vu et al. (2005), Maquet et al. (2005), Hobson (2009),
Domhoff (2001) on neural correlates of consciousness and the-
ories of dreaming; Schwartz et al. (2005), Hobson et al. (1998),
Ruby (2011) on a neuropsychological approach to dreaming
consciousness.
One important contribution to a theory for the emergence
of consciousness comes from Tononi and Edelman (Tononi and
Edelman, 1998; Tononi, 2004). They argue that a certain degree
of complexity must exist in order for consciousness to emerge.
Consciousness will not emerge from a system of completely inde-
pendent components, for example, a system of randomly acting
molecules of a gas. At the other extreme, consciousness will not
emerge from a completely ordered system like a crystal. In order
for consciousness to emerge there has to be some degree of inde-
pendence among the elements that make up the system and some
degree of dependence or relationship between these elements.
Tononi and Edelman further develop these ideas by showing
that consciousness as information can be achieved for a specific
degree of complexity. There is no information obtainable from
a system of completely independently acting elements. Likewise,
there is no information to be gained from a completely ordered
self-contained system of tightly bound elements. From an infor-
mation perspective, therefore, a system must have a degree of
complexity in order for it to yield information: not too much
independence and not too much dependence among its elements.
Consciousness is a form of information and will emerge only in a
sufficiently complex system of interacting elements, for example,
neurons in the brain. The Tononi and Edelman theory provides a
theory that explains why a sufficient amount of complexity must
exist before consciousness can emerge.
The self-organization theory of consciousness introduced
here in connection with dreaming consciousness adds a spe-
cific mechanism of self-organization to the information theory of
consciousness and complexity. The self-organization theory pos-
tulates that consciousness can emerge when a threshold degree of
complexity is reached among the cerebral processes in the brain.
For self-organization to occur, there has to be a sufficient density
of locally interacting neural elements that develop relationships.
Self-organization occurs when a threshold of integration or rela-
tionship is reached.
SELF-ORGANIZATION AND THE SELF
As a result of a self-organizing process in the dreaming brain, a
new self is created. By self is meant it is I who is doing the think-
ing and feeling and it is I who directs my actions. I have a body
that is mine and not someone else’s and I know where I am. The
dream self too is the self who does the thinking and feeling and
who is the protagonist in the unfolding dream. What emerges,
however, is a unique self, a self that is created from the experiences
of the dreamer, but put together in a unique way. The dream is put
together via a self-organizing process.
A new dimension of the self occurs while dreaming because
we are not actively controlling or directing the self. The ideas we
have built up over a lifetime on who we are, what we will and will
not do, and what we know is possible to do are mostly forgot-
ten when we dream. The dream is not created by the will of the
dreamer but by a coming together of memories, feelings, and new
thoughts whose unsuspecting author is the dreaming brain. The
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dream self does not control how individual memories that were
garnered over a lifetime become weaved into a dream. The dream
self is a part of its own creation, and at the same time the dream
self affects how the dream progresses.
LIMITATIONS OF THE SELF-ORGANIZATIONMODEL
Self-organization, however, does not predict or explain the emer-
gence of specific aspects of dreams, for example, the occurrence
of social aspects of dreams [a dream is likely to have 4–5 charac-
ters participating in the dream including the dream self (Kahn
et al., 2002)]. Content analysis provides much information on
dream content (Hall and Van de Castle, 1966), for example, on
such categories as the number of friendly or unfriendly interac-
tions, the number of known vs. unknown characters, and a slew
of many other important attributes of the dream self, such as
the dream self appearing in a first person perspective vs. a field
perspective watching the action unfold (Hall and Van de Castle,
1966; Domhoff, 2003). Self-organization theory of dream forma-
tion does not study the content of dreams; rather it provides a
mechanism for how mental activity coalesces into a dream. For
example, through the self-organizing process, people known and
unknown to the dreamer can appear together in a dream; people
in different time periods of the dreamer’s life can appear together;
and, equally important, self-organization can lead to a dream that
is completely novel, evenmore so than a dream containing a com-
plex combination of individuals, locations, and time periods. For
example, some creative dreams are of things or people that do
not exist in the dreamer’s wake world. Examples of such creative
dreams are given in Deirdre Barrett’s book (Barrett, 2010) and
Maquet andRuby (2004). This author recently dreamed of a never
before seen multi-dimensional and multi-colored wall-hanging
that rhythmically undulated in and out of the walls of a person’s
apartment wall.
CREATION OF THEWAKE SELF
When awake, our sense of self is affected by a number of fac-
tors (Blanke and Metzinger, 2009; Ramanchandran, 2011). These
include a feeling of unity; the sense that I am someone and that
someone is I. I am not two or more different people, even if I may
act that way on occasion, I am me, one body, I have this sense of
unity even if I am made up of different parts, like heart, brain,
bone, fingers. I have this sense of one me.
Another is the sense of continuity, the feeling that I have a his-
tory, I have had experiences, that there is continuity between who
I was and who I am now. I may have changed my beliefs; I may
have changed what I once considered important to now be unim-
portant. I may have changed my weight or my hairstyle over my
lifetime, but I still have a feeling that it is my history, not someone
else’s.
Another is the sense of embodiment. I have a body andmy body
is different than someone else’s body. My self is embedded in my
body even if my body may have changed during my lifetime; it’s
my body that has changed. When this sense of embodiment is
questioned as during an out-of-body experience (Blanke et al.,
2004), or during an induced artificial body illusion (Slater et al.,
2009), profound and often disturbing alterations in one’s sense of
self can ensue.
Free will is another attribute of the self; it is the feeling that
I can do something if I want to. Contributing to a sense of self,
in addition to the feeling of unity, continuity, embodiment is the
dynamic sense that I am free to act, that I am not a puppet led by
someone else.
Self-location is another aspect of the self; I know where I am
located in space. Contributing to a sense of self is the knowledge
that I am located somewhere in space; for example, I am sitting
in a chair, standing by the podium, or lying in bed. And when I
think about where I am in space, I have a sense that it is I who
is occupying that position in space. In out-of-body experiences,
for example, this sense of self is disrupted (Blanke and Metzinger,
2009).
Another aspect of the self is having a first person perspective.
There are several degrees of first person perspective as discussed
in Blanke and Metzinger (2009). For here, let it suffice to say
that exhibiting a first person perspective contributes to a sense
of self. Having a first person perspective translates to the knowl-
edge and feeling that it is I who is thinking, it is I who is
writing this sentence, and it is I who knows I am writing this
sentence.
Social embedding is another attribute that often helps give us a
sense of self. By social embedding is meant the feeling that I am
a part of a larger community; that I am in relationship with and
am able to recognize friends, family, and acquaintances. My sense
of self is influenced by how I feel I fit in or not fit in with others,
by a feeling of belonging or by a feeling of estrangement from the
group.
DREAMING AND THE SELF
Now we’ll look at these aspects of the self, unity, continuity,
embodiment, free will, self-location, first person perspective, and
social embedding, as they are experienced during dreaming.
Unity exists in the dream state as well; when dreaming, we feel
that it is I who is engaged in the action. The I who is engaged in
the dream may differ from the I who am awake but the sense that
there is an I who is experiencing exists in the dream.
The sense of continuity is different in the dream state. Unlike
the feeling that continuity exists over one’s lifetime when awake,
when dreaming each dream can stand alone; the dream and even
each dream segment can begin and end anywhere; in a way the self
begins when the scene begins. Continuity of the self exists mainly
only within the time period of the dream.
The sense of embodiment, that feeling that I have a body and
my body is different than someone else’s body, is much more
plastic when dreaming because the dreamer may inhabit a much
younger or older body and at times even one of a different gender.
The sense that one has free will, the ability to do something if
one wants, is often lost in dreaming. At times, the dreamer feels
like a participant in the unfolding action of the dream, rather than
in control. For example, we may want to dial a phone number but
cannot; we may want to apply the brakes in a fast moving vehicle,
but cannot. Strictly speaking, however, the dream self still has free
will since the dream self is trying to do what he or she wants to do
even if unsuccessful.
Self-location is preserved for the dream self even though the
dream self does not know that his or her physical body is in bed
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sleeping. The dream self believes its location to be wherever it is
in the dream even if the location may be highly improbable.
A first person perspective, the feeling that it is I who sees and
reacts, also occurs in dreaming, this most often as the protago-
nist in the action, though sometimes as a witness to the unfolding
events of the dream. Thus, the first person perspective contributes
to a sense of self also in dreaming.
Social embedding, the knowing that I am in relationship with
and am able to recognize friends, family, and acquaintances, con-
tributes to a sense of self when awake, but when dreaming, social
relationships may change. For example, some dream characters
may have a different name than the person it represents in one’s
wake life, or the dream character may be a blend of two or more
known wake life characters. A common discrepancy was found
to be in a dream character’s behaviors compared to that of the
person in one’s wake life (Revonsuo and Tarkko, 2002; Kahn and
Hobson, 2003, 2005; Kahn, 2007).
The most striking result was that in a large majority of cases
the dreamer did not notice these discrepancies during the dream;
they were noticed only upon waking from the dream. One rea-
son for not noticing discrepancies during the dream is that the
dreaming mind is unable to call upon external cues; our sense
of self while dreaming occurs within the context and the reality
of the dream. During dreaming we are caught up in the expe-
rience of the dream, because not only is our ability to utilize
external memory sources greatly reduced but also our access to
internal sources is selective (Fosse et al., 2003). Being caught up
in the experience of the dream allows the dream self to expand
beyond the episodic and autobiographical memories of the
wake self.
DREAMING AND THINKING
Our sense of self is also affected by howwe think.While dreaming,
we are mostly unable to engage our wake-state critical thinking
because we rarely examine the premises of the dream. This is true
even when wake-like thinking occurs within the dream (Kahn and
Hobson, 2005). Our ability to think within a dream event is more
or less preserved, but our thinking about the hallucinatory expe-
rience is mostly absent when dreaming; the dreamer only rarely
questions how the world works while engaged in the dream. Thus,
the dream self “allows” the improbable, implausible, and even the
impossible to become a part of how it identifies itself.
THE SELF-ORGANIZING PROCESS
But, how is this altered dream self created? As stated in the first
part of the Introduction, the dream self emerges through a self-
organizing process. What is a self-organizing process, does it have
wide application, and what are the reasons to believe that dreams
emerge from a self-organizing process?
Self-organization provides a mechanism by which structure
and behavior emerges from the interaction and the integration
of its component parts without direction imposed from the out-
side (Seeley, 2002). To quote from a recent article (Sasai, 2013),
“Self-organization is the spontaneous formation of ordered patterns
and structures from a population of elements (or individuals) that
have no or minimal patterns (Yates et al., 1987; Camazine et al.,
2001; Chuong and Richardson, 2009; Saetzler et al., 2011; Dobrescu
and Purcarea, 2011). Self-organization is seen in a wide variety of
non-living matter on earth, including molecular assembly in crys-
tal formation and in nanotechnology (Whitesides and Boncheva,
2002), . . .This form of pattern formation is often associated with the
concept of emergence, or the spontaneous appearance of an ordered
property of the whole that cannot be explained by the sum of the
complexity of its elements (Camazine et al., 2001).”
And Camazine (2004) offers a reason for appreciating the
importance of self-organization in biology: “One of the mysteries
of biology is how the enormous amount of morphogenic, physiolog-
ical, and behavioral complexity of living organisms can be achieved
with the limited amount of genetic information available within the
genome. Self-organization is one solution to this problem.”
EXAMPLES OF SELF-ORGANIZATION
Examples of self-organization abound both in nature and in the
inorganic world. In the inorganic world, the laser is an example
of the emergence of structure as a coherent beam of light. This
occurs through the cooperative behavior of photons leading to
the amplification and self-organization of a narrow frequency of
photons, the laser beam. In the laser, all diverse light frequen-
cies except one become “enslaved” by only one frequency, the
frequency of the laser. The laser is an example where many fre-
quencies of light interact but only one frequency remains after the
different frequencies self-organize; the frequency of the laser light
represents the winning coalition of frequencies (Haken, 1981,
1983, 1993; Kelso, 1995).
In the organic world, the formation of a termite’s nest
(Figure 1) from local activity amongmany termites is an example
of self-organization. A termite nest has an elaborate pillar and
FIGURE 1 | A termite nest. Taken from “An Introduction to Swarm
Intelligence Issues” by Gianni Di Caro, Swarm-part-1.pdf. Individual termites
will interact as they lay down pheromone. When a critical mass of termites
and pheromone is reached, the termites gather together to begin building
the termite nest. Individual termites through their interactions construct the
termite nest without instruction from an architect.
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arch structure. A possible mechanism is suggested by Camazine
(2004), “Starting with a homogeneous, flat landscape, the ran-
dom movements of the termites, and their dropping and picking
up behavior leads to tiny surface irregularities which become the
site of rising pillars. Once a pillar has emerged, this structure acts
as a source of heterogeneity that modifies the actions of individ-
ual builders. The activity, in turn, creates new stimuli that trigger
new building actions. Complexity unfolds progressively; increasingly
diverse stimuli result from previous building activities, and facili-
tate the construction of ever more complex structures.” The nest is
the place where the termites live and reproduce; it is necessary for
their survival.
Other examples of self-organization include the self-
organization of bacterial colonies (Cho et al., 2007), the
self-organization of birds into an efficient flight pattern, the
self-organization of a raft by fire ants to enable them to cross
a body of water (Mlot et al., 2011), and the self-organization
of single cell amoeba into a multicellular organism called the
dictyostelium discoideum that is capable of locomotion when a
food source must be located (Marée and Hogeweg, 2001).
What is common in these examples is that an environmental
change led to self-organization; an environmental change led to
the existing system becoming unstable. This instability induced a
re-organization from independent individual behavior to collec-
tive behavior that is able to meet the challenges of the changed
environment. We shall come back to this idea when we discuss
self-organization in the dreaming brain.
SELF-ORGANIZATION IN THE BRAIN
Closer to home is the self-organization of a system of dynami-
cally interacting neurons into a robust conscious state exhibiting
emergent properties (Colangelo et al., 2004; Karsenti, 2008). As
Singer (2009) states, “The brain presents itself as a highly dis-
tributed, self-organizing system that self organizes and produces all
those extraordinary phenomena that we as observers attribute to the
person, the self.”
The brain certainly has very many elements that interact,
which is one condition for self-organization to occur. The brain
consists of an enormous number of neurons (1012) each making
on average 1000 connections with each other. As a result of local
interactions within this large population of neurons, a competi-
tion forms between them until a subset of the winning synapses
become established. This winning subset of neuronal synapses
develops long-range coherence. This long-range coherence leads
to growing complexity and to the formation of neural networks,
then to a scaling up that eventually leads to consciousness, and to
a sense of self.
SELF-ORGANIZATION IN THE DREAMING BRAIN
The self-organization model for the emergence of self is especially
pertinent during dreaming when volitional control over access
to memories is absent; memories come unbidden when dream-
ing. It is certainly the case that even when one has full volitional
control as in the wake state, or partial volitional control as when
lucid, self-organizing processes are taking place. But these self-
organizing actions are mixed in with actions of the person him
or herself who is able to consciously direct the action even while
self-organizing processes such as internal generated patterns of
behavior may be going on in the background. When lucid, there
is both volitional and non-volitional control since when lucid one
is in a hybrid state: one is aware that one is dreaming (Voss et al.,
2009; Buzzi, 2011; Dresler et al., 2012). When lucid, both self-
organization and dreamer-controlled action can occur. When not
lucid, one is unaware that one is dreaming; the dreamer does
not have control over the actions of the dream, and hence self-
organizing processes is particularly germane to this non lucid
state of dreaming.
As we saw, self-organization occurs when the environment
changes so that a new system can emerge that is able to cope
with the changed environment; in the case of dreaming it is the
appearance of unsolicited thoughts and memories that lead to
their self-organization into a dream. These unsolicited thoughts
andmemories will self-organize into a coherent whole (Kahn and
Hobson, 1993). This is true whether the memories appear at ran-
dom (Hobson, 1988) or stem from specific wake life memories
and concerns. Since the unsolicited memories are self-organized,
the dream that emerges is not under control of the dreamer; a
new dimension of the self can, therefore, emerge in dreaming.
As a consequence of this self-organization of different memories,
dreaming allows the self to have experiences the wake self may not
have dared to have.
The reason why any particular memory appears in the
dreamer’s mind is outside the scope of this paper because
self-organization does not predict which memories will appear.
Theories that do address specific content include continuity the-
ory (Schredl and Hofmann, 2003; Schredl and Reinhard, 2009-
2010); Jungian and Freudian theories, and the threat simula-
tion theory (Valli et al., 2005). While self-organization does not
address which specific dream elements appear in the dreamer’s
mind, the self-organizing process explains the emergence of a
dream from the individual dream elements that do appear. And,
as we have seen, self-organization has a function; it creates a new
system capable of existing in a changed environment. For exam-
ple, starvation and the necessity to find food led individual cells
to self-organize into the mobile dictyostelium discoideum organ-
ism; the necessity to cross a body of water led individual ants to
self-organize into a raft made up of their own bodies; and the
need to sustain a colony of termites led individual termites to self-
organize to build a termite nest. The human need to connect and
make sense of unconnected or loosely connected dream elements
will lead to their self-organization into a dream. The fact that a
dream is formed from disparate dream elements suggests that a
function of the self-organizing process may simply be to create a
coherent story (the dream).
While the content of mental activity depends upon many
things, as we have said, the self-organization process, which puts
this content together into the dream, depends upon the environ-
ment. All self-organizing systems depend on the environment as
we discussed in a previous section. The environmental change
here occurs as we go from wake to the different stages of sleep.
The brain’s chemistry and specific regional activity changes as we
enter the different stages of non-rapid eye movement (NREM)
sleep and then again when we enter REM. The ability to integrate
information in NREM is impaired due to a reorganization of
Frontiers in Psychology | Consciousness Research July 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 408 | 4
Kahn Brain basis of self
large-scale networks into smaller independent modules (Bolya
et al., 2012). There is also a time of night effect which affects
brain activity and brain chemistry (Payne and Nadell, 2004). In
other words, we suggest that one reason dreams can be so wildly
different from one another is because of the different brain envi-
ronments that can exist. The process of dream formation through
a self-organizing process will yield different types of dreams in the
different brain environments of NREM, REM, and time of night.
PREDICTIONS OF THE MODEL
Self-organization hypothesizes that a full-fledged dream appears.
It is a model for how the different elements that appear in the
dream are woven together to make the dream. In the language
of physics, a phase transition occurs. All self-organized entities
appear as a whole, spontaneously, our model claims that the
dream appears as a whole spontaneously. The dream is formed
from elements but these elements do not stand off by them-
selves once they have been organized into the dream. It is only
when we are awake and ponder on the dream do we sometimes
dissect the dream, some of us in order to find meaning, oth-
ers to find function, others to look for relationship to everyday
occurrences.
One prediction of the model is in agreement with the idea that
dreams are a creation and not a replay of wake events and with
the ideas of central image theory (Hartmann, 2008, 2010). The
self-organization model predicts that a central story or theme
will emerge from the interaction of elements. As Haken (1993)
states it when discussing self-organization of the laser, one cen-
tral frequency will enslave all the others. This idea here is that
self-organization is a process by which the interacting elements
compete with each other until a dominant one succeeds, in a
sense, enslaving all other elements (Haken, 1993).
The protoconsciousness theory of Hobson (2009) postulates
that brain activity from the fetus onward is necessary for the even-
tual development of consciousness. Brain activity may or may
not be accompanied by dreams. For example, brain activity dur-
ing REM in the fetus may not be associated with dreams. Mental
activity in the form of dreams appears later, though exactly when
is not specified by the theory. When it does appear, the protocon-
sciousness theory suggests that dreams may provide the ultimate
simulation for coping successfully in one’s wake life activities. Our
self-organization model of how dreams are created from the ele-
ments of memory fragments can be considered an addendum
to the protoconsciousness theory in that it suggests a way that
dreams form from mental activity. This mental activity accord-
ing to both theories is the result of brain activity. According to
the protoconsciousness theory, this brain activity is a necessary
precursor to the eventual development of consciousness.
While protoconsciousness theory does not directly address
how the dream is created, the activation synthesis theory (Hobson
and McCarley, 1977) postulates that random firings of brainstem
neurons upon the forebrain yield dream formation. This theory
addresses mainly the activation part and not the synthesis, that is,
not how the dream elements are synthesized into a dream.
The cognitive theory of Domhoff (2001, 2003) and others does
address dream formation by postulating that dreaming like any
mental process is a cognitive process, and as such should be placed
in the same category as thinking. Dreaming then is thinking while
asleep. Dreams form, as do our thoughts when awake frommem-
ories, thoughts, feelings, and imagination. To this we simply add
that it is important to take into account the different activa-
tion and modulation (neurochemistry) that affects thinking in
the sleep compared to wake states. What the self-organization
hypothesis adds is a mechanism by which a dream emerges from
interacting dream elements.
Another hypothesis is Revonsuo’s threat simulation theory
(Valli et al., 2005) for the function of dreams. However, this the-
ory does not directly address a mechanism for the coalescing of
memory fragments into a dream.
HOW THE SELF IS CREATED
LESSONS FROM BRAIN-INJURED PATIENTS
How might mental illnesses or abnormal brain function give us
clues as to how the self is created in healthy people? First, we
review several studies that were able to associate specific changes
in how the self is expressed to damage in specific brain areas;
second, we will review studies of normal brain functioning in
different states of consciousness.
One change in the self that is caused by brain damage is known
as alien hand syndrome where a person’s hand seems to have a
will of its own, acting without instruction from its owner. In alien
hand syndrome a person no longer feels the unity of the self because
there seems to be two independent selves that are competing with
each other. The person with this malady, while perfectly able to
direct his non-alien hand to do his or her bidding, the alien hand
refuses to take orders. The alien hand acts as if it is independent
of its owner; the hand acts on its own. It turns out that this alter-
ation in the sense of unity can result after damage to the anterior
cingulate area of the brain.
Another alteration in the sense of self that can result from brain
damage is the out-of-body experience in which a person feels as
if he or she has left their body. In an out-of-body experience, one’s
sense of embodiment is questioned, and hence one questions whether
they inhabit their own unique body. There are various forms of
out-of-body experiences, one of which is when the patient feels
that they have left their body and are hovering over it, watching
the body from above. This alteration in the sense of the self as
an embodied being can result after brain trauma to the frontal
parietal regions and the temporal parietal junction.
Out-of-body experience is directly related to damage to the
temporal parietal junction area of the brain as indicated in
Figure 2.
Another alteration in one’s sense of self that is a result of brain
damage is called the Capgras syndrome (Edelstyn and Oyebode,
1999). In Capgras syndrome, there is a misidentification conflict
between what one sees and what one feels one is seeing. In this
syndrome, a person may have no problem visually recognizing
someone, but then insist that the person is an imposter, she’s
not who she looks like. This misidentification can occur even
between close relatives, brother, sister, mother father, or spouse.
His sense of relationship and social embedding has been altered; he
visually recognizes a person but refuses to believe his eyes. We nor-
mally use our relationships to help define ourselves. Since our sense
of relationship is fractured, so too is our sense of self. This condition
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FIGURE 2 | Damage to the temporal parietal junction was responsible for
the patient’s out-of-body experience. (A) Brain damage and results of
lesion overlap analysis in nine patients with OBEs due to focal brain damage is
shown. Maximal lesion overlap centers at the right TPJ at the angular gyrus
(red). Overlap color code ranges from violet (one patient) to red (seven
patients). Note that only one patient suffered from damage to the left TPJ. (B)
Voxel-based lesion symptom mapping (VLSM) of focal brain damage leading
to OBEs. The violet-to-red cluster shows the region that VLSM analysis
associated statistically with OBEs as compared to control patients. The
color-code indicates significant Z-Scores (p < 0.05; FDR-corrected) of the
respective voxels showing maximal involvement of the right TPJ, including the
right pSTG, angular gyrus, and middle temporal gyrus. (C) Self-location and the
TPJ. Comparison between the area reflecting experimentally induced changes
in self-location in healthy participants at the right TPJ using fMRI (red) and the
area reflecting pathologically induced changes in self-location in neurological
patients with OBEs using VLSM (blue). Taken from Ionta et al. (2011).
can result after damage to emotional areas of the brain that results
in a mismatch between emotion and visual identification.
While these examples are far from exhaustive, they do illustrate
the close relationship between our sense of self and the integrity
of our brains and help answer our question: how might mental
illnesses or abnormal brain function give us clues as to how the
self is created in healthy people?
LEARNING FROM NORMAL BRAIN FUNCTIONING
And how might normal brain functioning in different states of
consciousness give us clues as to how the self is created in healthy
people? We review studies that have identified brain area activity
when thinking about one’s self, when we daydream and when we
are asleep and dream.
AWAKE, FOCUSED, AND DAYDREAMING
Several midline cortical regions of the brain become active when
we are thinking about our personality traits, when we are thinking
about who we are. Thesemidline cortical areas are themedial pre-
frontal cortex (MPFC), the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), and
the perigenual anterior cingulate cortex (PACC) (Parvizi et al.,
2006; Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010; Ionta et al., 2011; Qin and
Northoff, 2011).
Differences were found in brain activity when one was think-
ing about one self compared to thinking about someone else (Qin
and Northoff, 2011). They found that there was activity in the
anterior cingulate cortex for self-specific stimuli that is, think-
ing about one self, but not for non-self specific stimuli, that is,
when thinking about someone else. This brain region specificity
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persisted even though an overlap in the midline cortical struc-
tures between self-specific and non-self specific stimuli exists. The
overlaps are instructive in themselves.
One of these overlaps in self-specific and non-self specific
thinking was the co-activation of the anterior insula cortex (AIC)
and the posterior anterior cingulate cortex (PACC). The AIC in
conjunction with the PACC contribute to humans being aware
of themselves, others, and the environment (Craig, 2009). Thus,
co-activation between the AIC and PACC seems to be impor-
tant for creating a self who is in relation to other selves. Qin and
Northoff (2011) suggest that this overlap of brain activity implies
that the self cannot be regarded as being completely of internal
origin, and cannot be regarded as coming purely from external
stimuli.
Tomake this point evenmore cogent, it was found that activity
in the PACC overlapped with activity in the default mode network
(DMN) when self-specific stimuli were presented. The DMN is
often considered a non-task driven state of consciousness that is
associated with mind wandering or daydreaming. The DMN is
attenuated only when engaged in goal-directed actions (Gusnard
and Raichle, 2001). When we daydream we often recall autobio-
graphical episodes; sometimes we mull over past encounters, and
very often we find ourselves thinking about, andmaking plans for,
the future. In short, we think about our self when we daydream
(Spreng et al., 2008; Gruberger et al., 2011).
The overlap that occurs in all three regions, the PACC repre-
senting external stimuli, the AIC representing stimuli of internal
origin, and the DMN representing the resting state when we
daydream, emphasizes that the self cannot be regarded as being
completely of internal origin, and cannot be regarded as com-
ing purely from external stimuli. The self emerges from internal
musings and external stimulation.
Figure 3 shows that the core areas of the default network, the
PCC and the anterior MPFC are activated when a person refer-
ences him or her self. Other components of the default network
also show increased activation during self-referencing.
ASLEEP AND DREAMING
Now, what about when we are not awake, focused, or daydream-
ing, but are asleep and dreaming? What is the brain basis for
such changes in the self as a reduced ability to see implausibil-
ity, to identify people accurately and to remember that one is in
bed sleeping? During the REM stage of sleep when dreaming is
most vivid, there is a functional disconnection of the dorsal lat-
eral prefrontal cortex with most of the rest of the brain, and a
deactivation of large areas of the parietal cortex (Maquet et al.,
1996, 2000; Braun et al., 1997, 1998; Maquet, 2000; Nofzinger
et al., 2002). The functional disconnection of the prefrontal cortex
significantly impairs the retrieval of episodic memory (Buckner
and Koutstaal, 1998; Cabeza and Nyberg, 2000; Rees et al., 2002).
Figure 4 shows PET study results in neural activity of specific
brain regions when in the REM stage of sleep.
There are also changes in the chemical neuromodulation of the
brain from aminergic to cholinergic when we move from wake to
the different stages of sleep. The reduction and eventual absence
of serotonin and norepinephrine in the forebrain as the subject
goes from waking to NREM to REM sleep help account for the
FIGURE 3 | This figure is from Andrews-Hanna et al. (2010).Whole-brain
exploratory analyses were conducted using the main effect contrast of self
trials vs. non-self control trials. Warm colors represent greater activation
during self trials, whereas cool colors represent greater activation during
non-self control trials. Increased activation during self trials was observed
prominently in the PCC and the MPFC and temporal parietal junction.
difficulty the dreamer has in noticing discrepancies between his
dream and real-life characters, as mentioned previously.
Table 1 illustrates the relative amount of the important neu-
rotransmitters, serotonin, norepinephrine and acetylcholine in
the wake, NREM and REM sleep stages. The table shows that
when awake and active the concentration of the neurotransmit-
ters acetylcholine, norepinephrine, and serotonin is high. During
the slow wave sleep (SWS) portion of NREM, the concentration
of acetycholine decreases significantly while the concentration of
norepinephrine and serotonin remains at the same level as in
the quiet wake period. During REM, however, the concentra-
tion of acetycholine becomes very high while the concentration
of norepinephrine and serotonin plummet to near zero levels.
Thus, quite remarkable and profound changes are occurring in
the brain’s chemistry throughout the night as the sleep stages go
through their cycles.
These changes in the neurochemistry of the brain in the differ-
ent stages of sleep affect the brain’smental activity and production
of dreams and affect one’s sense of self. The sense of self is affected
because these neuromodulators affect cognitive function, mood,
attention, the ability to retrieve memories, and the ability to pay
attention. For example, the aminergic system plays a key role
in maintaining vigilance, attention, and decision-making. The
extreme change in brain chemistry whereby the aminergic sys-
tem completely shuts down while the cholinergic system remains
high contributes to the occurrence of hallucinatory images dur-
ing dreaming and the reduced ability to recognize implausibility
within the dream (Kahn and Gover, 2010). These are impor-
tant factors that expand one’s sense of self. One is freed from
paying attention to logic and freed from making sense of one’s
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FIGURE 4 | Regions showing increased or decreased brain activity in the PET studies. Taken from Desseilles et al. (2011).
Table 1 | Neuromodulation varies across the wake-sleep cycle.
Active wake Quiet wake SWS REM
ACh Very high++ High+ Low− Very high+++
NE, 5-HT Very high++ High+ High+ Low−
When awake the concentration of acetycholine (Ach) and serotonin (5-HT) and
norepinephrine (NE) vary from very high (++) to high (+). When in slow wave
sleep the concentration of acetycholine decreases (−) while that of serotonin
and norepinephrine remains high (+); but in REM sleep the concentration of
acetycholine sharply increases (+++) but that of serotonin and norepinephrine
decreases (−).
surroundings. In dreaming, one is allowed to be in the experience
no matter how unlikely it might appear to a wake person. One
becomes open to whatever images, thoughts, and feelings emerge.
In addition to the important role played by the change in sero-
tonin and norepinephrine levels in REM sleep on dreams and the
dream self, as previously discussed, it is important to acknowl-
edge the role of dopamine in the formation of the dream self.
Since dopamine is related to goal-directed behavior and reward
processing, it seems natural that dopamine changes play a role
in the way the dream self conducts him or herself. The role of
the mesolimbic dopaminergic system, reviewed in Perogamvros
and Schwartz (2012), is active during sleep and undoubtedly
contributes to dream genesis and content.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
How the self is expressed depends on brain functioning. In the
unhealthy brain, depending on the patient’s specific brain dam-
age, the self may lose its sense of unity, continuity, embodiment
or social embedding, resulting in an altered sense of self. As we
saw in the Lessons from Brain-injured Patients section, in alien
hand syndrome a person no longer feels the unity of the self because
there seem to be two independent selves that are competing with
each other. In an out-of-body experience, one’s sense of embodi-
ment is questioned, and hence one questions whether they inhabit
their own unique body. This alteration in the sense of the self as an
embodied being can result after brain trauma to the frontal parietal
regions and the temporal parietal junction. In Capgras syndrome,
the patient visually recognizes someone but refuses to believe his
eyes. We normally use our relationships to help define ourselves.
Since our sense of relationship is fractured, so too is our sense of
self. This condition can result after damage to emotional areas of
the brain that results in a mismatch between emotion and visual
identification.
In a normal brain, the sense of self also depends on
how the brain is functioning, which in turn depends on
whether one is awake and focused, daydreaming or asleep and
dreaming.
One major difference in how the self is expressed when awake
and when asleep and dreaming is due to the changes in the neuro-
chemistry and neural activity in the dreamer’s brain that affect his
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or her sense of self. Another is that when dreaming it is not pos-
sible to conduct reality checks. When awake we might question
the occurrence of something unusual but we rarely question the
unusual when dreaming. And, while we can withdraw from the
daydream, we are not always able to voluntarily wake ourselves
to reenter the wake world. In the dream-state, we are caught up
in the dream experience and cannot control entrances and exits.
The dream self even when engaging in, and witnessing unusual
behavior, is often unaware of anything being unusual. For exam-
ple, the dream self may engage in behavior that the wake self
would not; the dream self may be young or old; strong or weak,
bold or shy. In this way dreaming reconstructs and expands the
self. The dream self, like the dream itself, is an emergent creation
arising out of an individual’s experiences as well as from thoughts
occurring when asleep and dreaming.
If a dream is recalled, one can explore aspects of the self by
examining the dream. However, even when dreams are forgotten,
the dream self has had the experience even if not recalled by the
wake self.
Does the dream have a function? As arising from a self-
organizing behavior, it does. Self-organization in biological sys-
tems is an answer to an environmental change for which the
existing system cannot cope; self-organization creates a system
that can cope in the newly changed environment. The self-
organizing process in biological systems happens, as we have seen,
as individuals engage in cooperative behavior to find food, cross a
body of water or fly in an efficient flight pattern. In dreaming, the
function of self-organization is to put together loosely connected
memories into a dream. And, one function of the dream may be
to insure we have a wide repertoire of experiences; this expanded
repertoire of experience results in an expansion of the self beyond
that obtainable when awake.
LIMITATIONS OF THE MODEL
One major shortcoming of the self-organization hypothesis of
dream formation is the difficulty of proving the hypothesis. We
have evidence that self-organization is a universal phenomenon
occurring in nature whenever conditions are favorable. Favorable
conditions include many locally interacting elements, a degree
of independence but also a degree of relationship between the
interacting elements (Tononi and Edelman, 1998), and a degree
of non-linearity such that even small changes can produce a
large change (at the tipping or bifurcation point). While we have
argued that the brain meets the conditions for self-organization
to occur, we were unable to demonstrate that the brain does
indeed use this ubiquitous phenomenon to produce dreams.
Other possible mechanisms for dream formation besides self-
organization include a built in template for the formation of
dream themes whereby elements come together from a built in
template similar to Jung’s idea of archetypal dream themes and
the collective unconscious. With a built-in template, there is no
need for self-organization. It would be nice to see an experiment
that could distinguish between these two mechanisms of dream
formation.
Finally, our hypothesis that a dream emerges when thoughts,
feelings, and images spontaneously self-organize is not in con-
tradiction to the ideas put forth by Nir and Tononi (2010) that
dreams come more from our imagination than from our percep-
tions. In either case, these coalesce into a story that is the dream
by a self-organizing process.
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